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13 14	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA				
15 16	SAN FRANCIS	CO DIVISION			
117 118 119 220 221 222 223 224	ASHLEY GJOVIK, Plaintiff, v. APPLE INC., Defendant.	Case No. 23-cv-4597-EMC DEFENDANT APPLE INC.'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT [F.R.E. 201] Dept: Courtroom 5, 17th Floor Judge: Honorable Edward M. Chen Date: May 16, 2024 Time: 1:30 p.m.			
26 27 28					

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Apple's Request for Judicial Notice (Dkt. 50; the "RJN") is a straightforward request that the Court consider, in connection with Apple's Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 48), two documents that are directly referenced and thus relied upon in Plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint (Dkt. 47; "TAC"). Nothing in Plaintiff's twelve-page opposition requires any contrary outcome.

Exhibit A to the RJN is Plaintiff's own SEC Submission, which she previously submitted to this Court in connection with a separate Motion for Judicial Notice that she filed. See Dkt. 35 at ¶12-13 (describing Exhibit 6 as containing "Gjovik's SEC whistleblower tip filed on August 31 2021" and arguing that judicial notice was proper "for the purpose of determining what statements the document [] contain[s]"); Dkt. 35-7 at pp. 3-21 (Exhibit 6, the SEC Submission). Exhibit B is Plaintiff's Offer Letter governing her employment at Apple, which she signed and references the TAC. Compare TAC ¶13 (alleging Plaintiff worked for Apple beginning on Feb. 23, 2015), ¶234 (alleging existence of "signed, written contract" that began her "employment relationship" with Apple) with RJN, Ex. B (Offer Letter with Feb. 23, 2015 start date). The TAC references Exhibits A and B and the contents thereof, and necessarily relies on these documents (by virtue of basing certain allegations on them). See, e.g., TAC ¶169 (referencing SEC Submission; "Gjovik filed an SEC whistleblower tip on August 31, 2021 ..."); ¶234 (referencing Offer Letter; "Gjovik and Apple entered into an employment relationship in 2015 with a signed, written contract."). Apple's request for judicial notice is in line with well-established case law whereby courts take judicial notice of such documents in evaluating the sufficiency of the pleadings on a motion to dismiss. See, e.g., Juster v. Workday, Inc., 2022 WL 3030530, at *1 n.1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2022) (offer letter); Ansell v. Laikin, 2011 WL 3274019, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2011) (SEC complaint); accord In re Google Assistant Priv. Litig., 457 F. Supp. 3d 797, 813-14 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (judicial notice of contract underlying breach of contract claims appropriate).

¹ The morning of April 16, Plaintiff filed three "declarations in opposition" to Apple's pending Motion to Dismiss, Motion to Strike, and Request for Judicial Notice. See Dkts. 55, 56, 57. The Court should not consider these untimely, improper filings in connection with the present matters. See Phigenix, Inc. v. Genentech Inc., 2019 WL 2579260, at *6 n.5-6 (N.D. Cal. June 24, 2019) (declining to consider "additional, untimely declaration in opposition" filed by pro se party "on the day of [the] reply deadline"); Warrick v. Birdsell, 278 B.R. 182, 187 (9th Cir. Bankr. 2002) (pro se litigant not excused from requirement to understand and follow bankruptcy court rules, particularly in light of fact that she held law degree and also ran paralegal firm); Ål-Ahmed v. Twitter, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 3d 857, 871 (N.D. Cal. 2022).

Case 3:23-cv-04597-EMC Document 60 Filed 04/16/24 Page 4 of 5

Plaintiff's arguments against judicial notice are unavailing. Contrary to Plaintiff's
suggestion, there is no requirement that a party meet and confer before the routine act of requesting
judicial notice in connection with a motion. See Opp. to RJN ¶5. Plaintiff next argues that Apple
failed to provide what she deems adequate proof of the authenticity of documents she signed
(including one she has previously offered to this Court (see id. ¶14) but provides no actual reason
to contest their authenticity—nor could she, given that she alleged the existence of each in the TAC
and was the author or signatory of each. See Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2) (emphasis added) (judicial
notice proper where accuracy "cannot reasonably be questioned"). Finally, and contrary to
Plaintiff's opposition, Apple appropriately requested that the Court take notice of the content of
Plaintiff's own SEC Submission and the Offer Letter she signed, rather than accepting Plaintiff's
attempt to characterize these documents in the TAC without attaching them. Contrast Opp. to RJN
¶22-28 with Moledina v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., 635 F. Supp. 3d 941, 946 (C.D. Cal. 2022) (citing
Data Disc, Inc. v. Sys. Tech. Assoc., Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1284 (9th Cir. 1977)) ("[T]he court may
not assume the truth of allegations contradicted by matters properly subject to judicial notice").

The documents for which Apple seeks judicial notice are ones whose authenticity Plaintiff cannot reasonably contest, and which Plaintiff chose to reference in the operative complaint. They are relevant to assessing whether her allegations (including allegations contained in the documents she references in the TAC) state a claim. *See, e.g.*, Dkt. 48 at 11, 13 (content of SEC complaint relevant to whether TAC alleges "protected activity" within the meaning of SOX or Dodd-Frank), 23 (content of "written, signed contract" Plaintiff alleges governed her employment relationship relevant to whether TAC states a claim for breach of contract or derivative claims).

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² Alternatively, even if one or more of the prerequisites of judicial notice were not satisfied (as Plaintiff argues), such documents could properly be considered in connection with Apple's Motion to Dismiss under the related doctrine of incorporation by reference. *See, e.g., Juster*, 2022 WL 3030530, at *1 n.1 (quoting *Khoja v. Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc.*, 899 F.3d 988, 1002 (9th Cir. 2018) (noting that the "incorporation-by-reference is a judicially created doctrine that treats certain documents as though they are part of the complaint itself[;] [t]he doctrine prevents plaintiffs from selecting only portions of documents that support their claims, while omitting portions of those very documents that weaken – or doom – their claims").

1	For the foregoing reasons, Apple respectfully requests that the Court take judicial notice of				
2	Exhibits A and B.				
3					
4	Dated: April 16, 2024	Ву:	/s/ Jessica R. Perry		
5			JESSICA R. PERRY Attorneys for Defendant Apple Inc.		
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